It worked well, possibly too well. In 1996, China and the United States each accounted for 13 percent of global steel production. By 2005, the United States share had dropped to 8 percent, while China’s share had risen to 35 percent, according to a study by Daniel H. Rosen and Trevor Houser of China Strategic Advisory, a group that analyzes the Chinese economy.
Similarly, China now makes half of the world’s cement and flat glass, and about a third of its aluminum. In 2006, China overtook Japan as the second-largest producer of cars and trucks after the United States.
Its energy needs are compounded because even some of its newest heavy industry plants do not operate as efficiently, or control pollution as effectively, as factories in other parts of the world, a recent World Bank report said.
Chinese steel makers, on average, use one-fifth more energy per ton than the international average. Cement manufacturers need 45 percent more power, and ethylene producers need 70 percent more than producers elsewhere, the World Bank says.
China’s aluminum industry alone consumes as much energy as the country’s commercial sector — all the hotels, restaurants, banks and shopping malls combined, Mr. Rosen and Mr. Houser reported.
Moreover, the boom is not limited to heavy industry. Each year for the past few years, China has built about 7.5 billion square feet of commercial and residential space, more than the combined floor space of all the malls and strip malls in the United States, according to data collected by the United States Energy Information Administration.
Chinese buildings rarely have thermal insulation. They require, on average, twice as much energy to heat and cool as those in similar climates in the United States and Europe, according to the World Bank. A vast majority of new buildings — 95 percent, the bank says — do not meet China’s own codes for energy efficiency.
All these new buildings require China to build power plants, which it has been doing prodigiously. In 2005 alone, China added 66 gigawatts of electricity to its power grid, about as much power as Britain generates in a year. Last year, it added an additional 102 gigawatts, as much as France.
That increase has come almost entirely from small- and medium-size coal-fired power plants that were built quickly and inexpensively. Only a few of them use modern, combined-cycle turbines, which increase efficiency, said Noureddine Berrah, an energy expert at the World Bank. He said Beijing had so far declined to use the most advanced type of combined-cycle turbines despite having completed a successful pilot project nearly a decade ago.
While over the long term, combined-cycle plants save money and reduce pollution, Mr. Berrah said, they cost more — and take longer — to build. For that reason, he said, central and provincial government officials prefer older technology.
“China is making decisions today that will affect its energy use for the next 30 or 40 years,” he said. “Unfortunately, in some parts of the government the thinking is much more shortsighted.”
The Politics of Pollution
Since Hu Jintao became the Communist Party chief in 2002 and Wen Jiabao became prime minister the next spring, China’s leadership has struck consistent themes. The economy must grow at a more sustainable, less bubbly pace. Environmental abuse has reached intolerable levels. Officials who ignore these principles will be called to account.
Five years later, it seems clear that these senior leaders are either too timid to enforce their orders, or the fast-growth political culture they preside over is too entrenched to heed them.
In the second quarter of this year, the economy expanded at a neck-snapping pace of 11.9 percent, its fastest in a decade. State-driven investment projects, state-backed heavy industry and a thriving export sector led the way. China burned 18 percent more coal than it did the year before.
China’s authoritarian system has repeatedly proved its ability to suppress political threats to Communist Party rule. But its failure to realize its avowed goals of balancing economic growth and environmental protection is a sign that the country’s environmental problems are at least partly systemic, many experts and some government officials say. China cannot go green, in other words, without political change.
In their efforts to free China of its socialist shackles in the 1980s and early 90s, Deng and his supporters gave lower-level officials the leeway, and the obligation, to increase economic growth.
Local party bosses gained broad powers over state bank lending, taxes, regulation and land use. In return, the party leadership graded them, first and foremost, on how much they expanded the economy in their domains.
To judge by its original goals — stimulating the economy, creating jobs and keeping the Communist Party in power — the system Deng put in place has few equals. But his approach eroded Beijing’s ability to fine-tune the economy. Today, a culture of collusion between government and business has made all but the most pro-growth government policies hard to enforce.
“The main reason behind the continued deterioration of the environment is a mistaken view of what counts as political achievement,” said Pan Yue, the deputy minister of the State Environmental Protection Administration. “The crazy expansion of high-polluting, high-energy industries has spawned special interests. Protected by local governments, some businesses treat the natural resources that belong to all the people as their own private property.”
Mr. Hu has tried to change the system. In an internal address in 2004, he endorsed “comprehensive environmental and economic accounting” — otherwise known as “Green G.D.P.” He said the “pioneering endeavor” would produce a new performance test for government and party officials that better reflected the leadership’s environmental priorities.
The Green G.D.P. team sought to calculate the yearly damage to the environment and human health in each province. Their first report, released last year, estimated that pollution in 2004 cost just over 3 percent of the gross domestic product, meaning that the pollution-adjusted growth rate that year would drop to about 7 percent from 10 percent. Officials said at the time that their formula used low estimates of environmental damage to health and did not assess the impact on China’s ecology. They would produce a more decisive formula, they said, the next year.
That did not happen. Mr. Hu’s plan died amid intense squabbling, people involved in the effort said. The Green G.D.P. group’s second report, originally scheduled for release in March, never materialized.
The official explanation was that the science behind the green index was immature. Wang Jinnan, the leading academic researcher on the Green G.D.P. team, said provincial leaders killed the project. “Officials do not like to be lined up and told how they are not meeting the leadership’s goals,” he said. “They found it difficult to accept this.”
Conflicting Pressures
Despite the demise of Green G.D.P., party leaders insist that they intend to restrain runaway energy use and emissions. The government last year mandated that the country use 20 percent less energy to achieve the same level of economic activity in 2010 compared with 2005. It also required that total emissions of mercury, sulfur dioxide and other pollutants decline by 10 percent in the same period.
The program is a domestic imperative. But it has also become China’s main response to growing international pressure to combat global warming. Chinese leaders reject mandatory emissions caps, and they say the energy efficiency plan will slow growth in carbon dioxide emissions.
Even with the heavy pressure, though, the efficiency goals have been hard to achieve. In the first full year since the targets were set, emissions increased. Energy use for every dollar of economic output fell but by much less than the 4 percent interim goal.
In a public relations sense, the party’s commitment to conservation seems steadfast. Mr. Hu shunned his usual coat and tie at a meeting of the Central Committee this summer. State news media said the temperature in the Great Hall of the People was set at a balmy 79 degrees Fahrenheit to save energy, and officials have encouraged others to set thermostats at the same level.
By other measures, though, the leadership has moved slowly to address environmental and energy concerns.
The government rarely uses market-oriented incentives to reduce pollution. Officials have rejected proposals to introduce surcharges on electricity and coal to reflect the true cost to the environment. The state still controls the price of fuel oil, including gasoline, subsidizing the cost of driving.
Energy and environmental officials have little influence in the bureaucracy. The environmental agency still has only about 200 full-time employees, compared with 18,000 at the Environmental Protection Agency in the United States.
China has no Energy Ministry. The Energy Bureau of the National Development and Reform Commission, the country’s central planning agency, has 100 full-time staff members. The Energy Department of the United States has 110,000 employees.
China does have an army of amateur regulators. Environmentalists expose pollution and press local government officials to enforce environmental laws. But private individuals and nongovernment organizations cannot cross the line between advocacy and political agitation without risking arrest.
At least two leading environmental organizers have been prosecuted in recent weeks, and several others have received sharp warnings to tone down their criticism of local officials. One reason the authorities have cited: the need for social stability before the 2008 Olympics, once viewed as an opportunity for China to improve the environment.
中文:它工作的太良好了，可能好的过头了。据中国战略顾问（一个分析中国经济的组织）丹尼尔和特雷夫的研究表明，在1996年，中国和美国的的钢铁生产都各自占了世界钢铁生产的13%，
到2005年，美国的份额下降到8%，而中国的份额猛增到35%。
近似的，现在中国也生产了占整个世界一半的水泥和平面玻璃，还有世界1/3的铝。2006年，中国超过日本成为了继美国之后的世界第2大小汽车和卡车生产大国。一份最近的世界银行报道指出，它的能源需求是混合需求的，因为其一些最新的重工业工厂并不能象世界上其他地方的工厂那样有效率的操作或者有效率的控制污染。
世界银行说，一般来说，中国钢铁制造商，每生产一吨的钢铁所消耗的能源比世界平均消耗量多1/5，水泥生产商需要多消耗45%的能量，并且乙烯生产商的能量消耗比世界上别处的厂商多70%。
罗斯先生和H先生说，单单就是中国铝制造业所消耗的能量就和国家商业部门，即全部的旅店，饭店，银行和百货商场所消耗的总和一样多。
根据美国能源信息局收集的数据表明，此外，繁荣并不是限制于重工业的。在过去几年的每一年，中国建造了大约75亿平方英尺的商业和居民楼盘，远多于美国的所有商场和连锁店的房屋面积的总和。
世界银行指出，中国建筑极少有隔热装置。一般上，他们用于发热和制冷的能量是与那些美国和欧洲相似气候地区的2倍。银行说，绝大部分是新建筑（95%），中国自身的能量功效还不能满足这些新建筑。
这些新建筑要求中国建造更多的电厂，它们的需求是巨大的。仅2005年，中国就向其电网增加了660亿瓦特的电量，这可是英国通常一年的总发电量。去年，中国又增加了1020亿瓦特电量，这是法国一年的总发电量。
世界银行一位能源专家B先生说，增加发电量的几乎全部来自于那些建筑周期短，成本低的中小型火电厂。这些火电厂只有小部分在使用现代的，能够增加效率的组合循环涡轮机来发电。他说，尽管中国已经在近十年前已经完成了一个成功的研发工程，但中国至今还拒绝使用那种组合循环涡轮机最先进的型号。
从长远的角度来看，组合循环涡轮机发电厂能够节约金钱和减少污染，B先生说，这些发电厂的成本高，建筑时间长，至于其他原因，他说，中央政府和省政府的官员更喜欢落后科技。
今天中国正在下决心，这将影响其下个30或40年的能源使用，他说，不幸的是，政府的一些部门认为这是很眼光短见的。
污染政策
自从2002年胡锦涛成为共产党主席，温家宝在明年春天时成为总理，中国的领导层打破了以前一直不变的政治生活主题。经济必须一个可持续的，少泡沫的步伐发展。环境的滥用已经达到了无法容忍的层度，那些无视这些政策的官员将会遭到法院的传唤。
5年过去了，这些高级领导人既因胆怯而不能执行命令，也因他们支持的这种快速增长的政治文化氛围已根深蒂固而不能改变他们。
今年第二季度，经济发展达到了令人窒息的速度----11.9%，这是十年中最快的了。国有投资工程，国家财政支持的重工业和蒸蒸日上的出口业领导了这一切。中国比其过去任何一年多消耗了18%的煤矿。
中国的政治体制再次证明了其对威胁到共产党统治时所进行压制的能力。但是中国没有意识到他所承诺的平衡经济增长和环境保护的目标是一个国家环境问题的征兆，至少是部分系统的问题，许多专家和一些政府官员说。中国不能变绿，换言之，政治体制不改变的话。
在20世纪60年代和90年代初，努力将中国从其自身的社会桎酷中解放出来，邓小平和他的支持者给下层官员们退路和职务，去增加经济增长。
地方党领导人获得了显著的控制国有银行贷款，税收，管理和土地使用的权利。作为报答，党领导人对它们进行评比，首要的就是他们在其管辖范围内能扩张多少。用其原始目标（激磁经济，创造工作岗位和保持共产党的权威）来判断，“邓小平系统“是一枝独秀的。但是，他的方案也侵蚀了北京能够很好调控经济的能力。今天，政企勾结的模式几乎使得政府政策很难执行。
环境持续恶化的背后主要原因是衡量政治成绩时的一个错误观点。国家环保局负责人潘越说，
高污染，高消耗的工业疯狂的扩张产生了特殊的利益。因为有当地政府保护，一些商业破坏那些属于全国人民的自然资源就好象这些资源是他们自己的私有财产一样。
胡先生已经试着改变这个系统。在2004年的一个内部演讲上，他签署“全面的环境和经济核算”，也称“绿色G.D.P.”。他说“先锋队的努力”会产生一个全新的政府和党政官员成绩的评测，它能更好的反映出领导阶层的环境优先权。
绿色G.D.P.小组开始对每个省进行每年破坏环境和人类健康的计算。去年，他们公布了第一份报告，估计2004年的污染占到全国生产总值的3%还要多，这就意味着年调控污染增长率从10%降到了7%。在当时官员们说他们的公式只是用于对环境破坏健康的保守估计，没有评估对中国生态的影响。他们将在明年提供一个更加具有决定性的公式规则。
但是这一切没有发生。参加过这个项目的人说，胡先生的计划在激烈的争执中“死掉了“。原定于在三月份绿色G.D.P小组发布第2份报告，也销声匿迹了。
官员对此的解释是绿色指标后面的科学技术还不成熟。绿色G.D.P小组主要学术研究员王金楠说，省领导杀掉了这个工程，官员们不喜欢这样排列名次，并且告之他们不能满足领导阶层的目标，他说，他们认为很难接受这项工程。
冲突的压力
尽管绿色G.D.P工程失败了，政党领导人坚持认为他们打算限制能源利用和排放。去年政府公布了国家要用少于20%的能源在2010年去实现与2005年相同级别的经济实力。并且还要求水银，二氧化硫和其他污染物质的总排放量比同期要下降10%。
这个计划是一个国内命令。但是这也成为了中国对于全球变暖斗争逐渐增加的国际压力的主要回应。中国领导人拒绝了命令性的排放法案，他们说能源效率计划将会减少二氧化碳的排放。
即使在重压下，效率目标也很难实现。在目标提出后的整整一年，排放增长了而没有减少。每一美圆的经济产出远远少于其4%的临时目标。
在与公众联系中，政党的保护许诺似乎还很坚定。胡先生在出席今年夏天的中央委员会会议是没有象平常那样穿西装打领带。国家新闻媒体说，在人民大会堂的温度，人们设定为一个比较温和的华氏温度79度以节省能源，官方也鼓励其他部门也把温度调节设置调到相同的温度。
虽然，其他的方法，领导层还是行动缓慢的说明环境和能源有关的问题。
政府极少用市场导向政策来刺激减少污染。官员拒绝在电力和煤炭上引进额外费用的建议，用来反映环境的真实成本。国家还仍旧控制燃油的价格，包括汽油，驾驶成本津贴。
在官僚机构中，能源和环境官员的影响力很小。中国环境机构仍旧只有200个全职人员，相比之下，美国的环境保护机构就有18000人。
中国没有能源部长。国家发改委的能源局，就是这个国家的中央计划机构，有100个全职人员。美国的能源部门则有110000职员。
中国有一个“军“的业余管理者。环境保护论者揭露污染，并且给当地政府施加压力，迫使当地政府执行环境保护法律。但是私人单位和无政府组织不能跨越在鼓吹和没有逮捕风险的政治煽动之间的鸿沟。
在最近的几个星期里，至少有两个主要环境保护组织被起诉，还有其他的一些组织也得到严厉的警告，让他们降低对当地官员的批评。引用权威所说的一个原因，在2008年奥运会以前社会需要稳定，曾经奥运会还被视为一个改善中国环境的机会。 |
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